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Summary findings
The transition to markets dominates the development  Privatization policies, in particular in housing and
agenda of the 1990s. Financial sector reforms are central  real estate.
to a successful transition to a market economy. Renaud  *  The strategies adopted  - whether by design or by
focuses on one dimension of these reforms: the  default - to reform the financial sector.
development of housing finance institutions and services.  *  The nature of the financial priorities and
He presents a progress report  for the years since 1989,  institutional constraints affecting housing finance reform
when the road to change opened with the collapse of  strategies followed in different countries.
communist regimes in most countries. Rather than a  Housing finance policy development has been
detailed account of reform in 25 countries,  he offers a  somewhat haphazard in many countries. But the
general framework for analyzing change and evaluating  evidence suggests that the transition economies that have
the prospects for rapid development of market-based  achieved low inflation, have adopted radical banking
housing finance systems.  reforms, and seriously reformed and liberalized their real
To understand why sound housing finance systems  estate sector should be among the first to develop a
have not yet developed, one must consider factors in  modern system of housing finance.
four key reform areas:
* The macroeconomic policies adopted to liberalize
the economy and stabilize prices.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The transition to markets dominates the development agenda of the 1990's
for several reasons.  First, about 35 percent of the world's population lives in socialist
economies that were centrally planned until recently.  Second,  most of these countries
have been undertaking profound reforms of their institutions and economic structure
since 1989. This reform process has been absorbing a very large share of the resources
available for technical assistance from the European Union, the United States, Japan,
Canada and other countries.  In addition to the large share of the world's population
affected by the transition to market, strong international efforts are also justified by the
fact that world stability will greatly benefit from a successful and rapid transition.  This
paper focuses on one dimension of reform, housing finance, and presents a progress
report for the early years of this transition to market since 1989 when the road to change
opened up with the collapse of communist regimes in most countries.
A detail account of the on-going housing and housing finance reforms
their progress and temporary setbacks across 25 or so countries could be overwhelming.
Instead, what  is offered here is a general framework which will help us interpret the
changes that have been taking place.  Concisely speaking, what are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the rapid emergence of market-based housing finance in this very
distinct group of countries? This is the central question.  It bears repeating that the
transition to markets is  a process and not an event. Therefore the choice of evaluation
criteria is important if we are to properly identify constraints on the development of
commercial  housing finance and gauge progress.  How long the transition might take
I  FThe  author  is Housing  Finance  Advisor,  Financial  Sector  Development  Department,  the World
Bank, Washington  DC. T  his paper is based  on the plenary  presentation  made  to the XXlrst World  Congress
of Housing  Finance  Institutions,  London,  September  13, 1995. However,  the views  presented  here  are the
sole responsibility  of the author.  They  should  not be attributed  to the World  Bank  and its affiliates.
Icannot be foretold if we do not inventory properly the multiple reforms that are in
progress.  The housing systems of these former socialist countries share many systemic
features.  Yet, in spite of these important common features, the transition differs very
much across countries.  To evaluate the prospects for a rapid development of the housing
finance system we will consider the pace and scope of reforms in four key policy areas.
First, we consider the macroeconomic policies adopted toward economic liberalization
and price stabilization. Second, we review privatization conditions in the key sectors of
the economy, including housing and the real estate sector. Then we proceed to the
financial sector reform strategies adopted by the authorities, by design or by default,
toward the old finance system.  Finally, we can provide an account of the nature of the
housing finance strategies followed by different countries.
II.  LIBERALIZATION  AND STABILIZATION
2.1 A Typology of Socialist Countries Along the Path to Market2
The process of economic reform was not new to socialist economies prior
to the communist collapse of 1989. In fact, these countries' post-war history is marked
by successive attempts at reviving the economy and remedying the secular decline in
growth that gradually set in after the switch to central planning.  After 1989, however, the
objectives of reform are very different with full democracy and the move to markets. The
early years has been have been marked by international debate about the relative
efficiency and social costs of gradual versus radical reforms. 3 The latter being colorfully
described but somewhat misrepresented by the press as "shock therapy" or "big bang"
with the suggestion that the social costs of change would necessarily be greater under
radical than under gradual reforms.  In practice, different governments have made
different choices, and  these former communist countries are moving along the path to
market at various speeds.  To order and interpret this diversity of experience across some
25 countries, a country typology can be helpful.  It must reflect the extent to which
governments have so far been willing and able to take public action in three major areas
of economic liberalization:
*  the liberalization of the internal market through price liberalization and the abolition
of the state trading monopolies;
2  This typology has been developed by Martha DE MELO, Cevdet DENIZER, and Alan GELB in
their paper "From Plan to Market: Pattern of Transition", Transition Economics Division, The World Bank,
May 1995, unpublished.
3  See Leczek BALCEROWICZ "Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparisons
and Lessons" IFC Second Annual Lecture, Washington DC, December 1,1993; Leczek BALCEROWICZ
and Alan GELB "Macro-policies In Transition To A Market Economy: A Three-Year Perspective", World
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, April 1994, Waslhington  DC.
2*  the liberalization of international trade of external markets with extensive changes in
the external trade regime and moves toward  internal and external currency
convertibility;
*  support to the private sector and competition with freedom of entry into all sectors
with the privatization of state enterprises and the development of banking reforms
moving in parallel.
It is possible to develop cumulative indices measuring change over the last five or six
years in these three policy areas and to reflect reasonably well the relative quality of the
overall reform environments across countries.  The result is a very suggestive clustering
of countries into five groups of countries strung along the long road to a full market
economy.  The clustering of these 25 or so countries is as follows:
Group 1- Advanced Reformers: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. The Czech Republic and Slovenia are often considered to be leading members
of this first group in terms of speed and quality of change.
Group 2 - High Intertnediate Reformners:  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Bulgaria,
Romania.  In this group, Estonia is the former Soviet republics that has moved the most
energetically and successfully toward market.
Group 3 - Low Intermediate Reformers:  Russia, Moldova, Kazakhaztan, Kyrgyzstan.
The Dominant member of this group is Russia where there remains considerable scope
for progress in the macroeconomic, legal, and financial areas before the emergence of
market based housing finance can develop on a significant scale.
Group 4 - Slow Reformers* Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan.  These are the
countries that tried to continue with central planning.  They have been the most reluctant
to make needed macroeconomic reforms during the first years of the transition.  Because
of its resources, size and significance for Western Europe, Ukraine's  case is best known.
Group 5 - Countries at War:  Republics of the  former  Yugoslavia, Armenia, Georgia,
Azerbijan, Tajikistan.  Unfortunately, these are countries were age-old ethnic conflicts
instead of being resolved in the socialist era were merely buried and have resurfaced
under the social, political, and economic stresses that the transition would have generated
in any case.
To round out this international typology, a sixth group of Asian socialist
economies could be added. This group  would include China, Vietnam, North Korea, and
possibly Burma as cases that differ significantly from the countries of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union.  While Asian, Mongolia would be better treated analytically as
a former Soviet republic.  It is also important to reiterate that the present clustering
reflects the early years of change.  With decisive leadership and some good fortune, one
or more countries might well speed ahead of their present group. Others could fall behind.
32.2 Initial Impact of the Transition  on Economic  Performance
The initial moves from plan to market have lead to four economic
outcomes that we find repeated in country after country, across Central  and Eastern
Europe and Soviet countries:
*  A significant decline in output linked to the disruption of the old system of economic
coordination by the state. This output decline was accentuated by the disruption of
trade patterns among these countries that were traditionally dictated by governments
under the old CMEA trade arrangements, popularly known as the Comecon.
*  A sharp increase in open inflation following the initial price liberalization after
decades of price controls.  The impact on consumers is not entirely negative given
trade-offs between this open inflation and the end of the shortages and queues which
had become increasingly long prior to the communist collapse.
*  An important movement of resources across sectors of the economy. These shifts are
the consequence of the move from state-planned decisions to market-driven
decisions, both on the internal and external markets. Resource transfers also reflect
the important distortions that existed between socialist domestic prices and actual
prices on the world markets.  These distortions were especially important in the
energy sector and have had a large impact on housing construction and operation.
*  Important gains in private sector output with the new encouragement of private sector
activities and the shifts to private ownership. However, these gains are usually not
well recorded by official statistics since the information network of the old statistical
bureaus focused on state enterprises and public activities.  A significant source of
these private sector gains has been the rapid emergence of private regional trade flows
with Western Europe and of new links with the rest of the world.
Output decline has been particularly severe in the housing sector.
Housing is a sector where the state had achieved almost total dominance through
monopoly control of access to land, financing, and the supply and price of materials,
especially in the larger cities.  With the disruption of state controls, very high inflation
and falling wages, the initial years of the transition have been marked by a massive
collapse of housing output.  Figure 1 shows the decline in the number of completed new
housing units in seven countries representative of Group 1 (Czech Republic, Poland,
Hungary, and Slovakia), Group 2 (Bulgaria, Romania),  and Group 3 (Russia).  To
facilitate comparisons,  annual housing production in these seven countries is
standardized on the national production level in year 1986, the last year of economic
stability in many of these countries. 4
4  1 am grateful  to Dr. Margarete  Czemy  of the Austrian  Institute  of Economic  Research  (WIFO)  for
providing  me with the latest  data on Eastern  Europe  and her own evaluations  "Trends  in Eastern  Europe:
1995/96"  prepared  for the arnual Euroconstruct  Outlook  Conference,  London,  June 1995.
4Figure 1 shows that housing output usually remained level until 1988 and
entered a period of precipitous decline after 1989. Hungary is a notable exception.  It has
been the first country to experiment with "market socialism" and moved away from direct
state housing production after 1981. Since that year, Hungarian housing output has been
in a phase of continuing decline from which it had not yet recovered in 1994. Even if we
take into account the statistical reporting problems for private activities mentioned earlier
and for investment in housing rehabilitation that is mostly unreported, it is undeniable
that the withdrawal of the state from direct housing production has led to a precipitous
fall in annual output.  In most  countries, during these early years of transition  the
volume of unfinished housing under construction was several times the old annual
volume of completed output.  The housing contraction has been particularly severe in
Bulgaria and Romania where the number of units completed in 1984 was reported as less
than 20 percent of what it was in 1986.
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T'he contraction of housing output raises two obvious questions. Why this
calamitous housing contraction? Why is the private sector so slow to take the relay of
public sector production?  In reply, the central claim of this review --  and its leitmotiv --
is that during the early years of the transition neither the necessary nor the sufficient
conditions for the revival of the housing sector and for the development of a market-
based housing finance system were in place yet.
52.3 Necessary  Conditions  for Market-Based  Housing  Finance
From a macroeconomic  viewpoint, three necessary  conditions  for the
revival of the housing sector  are the resumption  of economic  growth,  the lowering  of
inflation  to at least  a moderate  level,  the recovery  of real wages  and a return to a
perception  of employment  stability  for the greatest  majority  of the population. These
conditions  were beginning  to be met  among  the "advanced  reformers"  of Group 1,
especially  the Czech  Republic  and some  of the "high intermediate  reformers"  of Group 2,
Estonia in particular.  Figure  2 shows  that these  two groups  of countries  were
experiencing  a positive  rate of GDP growth  again  by 1984,  while the countries  of 'low
intermediate  reformers"  of Group  3 and the "slow  reformers"  of Group 4 were enduring
economic  contraction.
FIGURE  2: GDP  Growth  Path  Across  the  Four  Country  Groups
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Macroeconomic  stabilization  and the return  to some  degree  of price stability  has
been  extremely  difficult  to achieve  in most transition  economies,  partly because  of the
deep but hidden  macroeconomic  disequilibria  that  had accumulated  during  the 1980s.
The Czech  Republic  is a rare exception. As Figure 3 shows,  the scale of inflation  has
been  massive  by the standards  of market  economies  across  the four country  groups.
However,  each group has followed  a significantly  different  path with Group 4 still
experiencing  annual  average  inflation  rates well above 1500  percent  per year in 1983  and
1984. Even  the inflation  experience  of the best reformers  has prevented  the emergence
of market-based  long-term  finance  needed  for housing  until 1994. Figure 4 shows  the
improving  performance  of the members  of Group 1 between 1989  and 1994.  Yet, if we
zoom further  onto the years 1992  to 1994  (Figure  5) we see how  difficult  it remains  even
for these leading  countries  to achieve  what Latin  American  economists  used to call a
moderate  inflation"  around  20 percent  (Figure  5). Such an inflation  rate would  be seen
6as disastrous  by Western  or North American  countries  and remains  a major impediment
to housing finance. 5
FIGURE  3: CPI Inflation  Across  the Four  Country  Groups
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FIGURE  4: Inflation  Experience  of  Advanced  Reformers
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See Rudiger DORNBUSCH and  Stanley FISHER  "Moderate Inflation, The World Bank
Economic Review,  January 1993, Vol. 7, No. 1.
7FIGURE  5: Advanced  Reformers:  New "Moderate"  Inflation
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The third necessary condition of an improving wage situation was met by
the group of "advanced reformers" in all five countries by 1994.  Originally, all four
groups of countries have experienced a very sharp real wage decline when they initiated
market reforms.  Even the countries of Group I experienced overall real wage declines of
the range of 25 percent for two successive years in 1990 and 1991 (see Figure 6).  These
sharp initial losses were only partially made up in the following years.  Once again, we
can see that Hungary which pioneered  "market socialism" experienced less pronounced
wage fluctuations and smaller year-to-year real wage losses.  Yet, even the reported
Hungarian wage losses were of the order of 5 percent annually.  Such losses would create
major political tensions in Western economies.
The demand for market mortgage finance has been minuscule due to the
combination of three negative factors: job insecurity that results from a sharp contraction
in output; high inflation with the higher risk, higher real interest rates. and its front
loading of real repayments on long-term loans; falling real wages that cut back on the
ability to save.  Each one of these three factors would have been individually enough to
curtail the demand for mortgage finance in well-established markets economies.  In
addition, housing finance in transition economies is facing other obstacles in the initial
years.  The development of long-term mortgage lending is also shaped by the speed and
quality of privatization in the real estate sector and by the sustained quality of the
financial reforms pursued by the government.  These two other key policy areas must also
be taken into account if we want to properly gauge the potential speed of development of
the new housing finance system. We now turn to privatization.
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I11.  HOUSING  PRIVATIZATION
3.1 Housing  as One of the "Four  Privatizations"
The Hungarian economist Janos Kornai has been the leading analyst of the
structure, behavior, and performance of socialist economies.  He has pointed out the
affinity that exists between forms of ownership on one hand and economic control
mechanisms and modes of financing on the other. 6 In socialist economies we have state
ownership, state financing, an atrophied financial system (as we shall discuss in the next
section) and widespread state monopolies over the production and distribution of goods
and services.  By contrast, in market economies private forms of ownership dominate and
financing is provided by the banking system and the capital markets. Competition and
contestable markets form  the cornerstone of public policy in these economies. Even
when and where public activities are significant. they are also evaluated with reference to
that analytical and policy yardstick.  Housing privatization is a very much a precondition
to market-based housing finance: where there is no housing sold to private individuals
there will be no demand for private mortgage finance, because there is no need for it.
6  See in particular Kornai's  grand synthesis, The Socialist System, The Political Economy of
Communism, Princeton Universitv Press, 1992.
9Socialist countries made the goal of universal access to housing and its provision
by the state at trivial prices an important claim of the superiority of socialism over
capitalism. Yet, by the end of the 1  980s there was no other sector of their economy where
the system of state production and allocation met with such universal dissatisfaction as
housing.  The economic and institutional reasons why the direct provision of housing by
the state is usually a failure and cannot be expected to meet  Vopular  expectations --
especially as incomes rise -- are well understood and known.  Housing is not a very
complex  technical good to produce in industrial societies.  On the other hand, housing is
perhaps the most complex economic good to analyze and manage properly because of its
durability, heterogeneity, spatial fixity and sensitivity to the specific financial and
regulatory environment in which it is provided. 8
After decades of  provision by the state, housing is now one of the "four
privatizations"  in transition economies together with the privatization and restructuring
of large state enterprises, the privatization of medium and small scale urban enterprises,
and that of agriculture.  Because Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russia are fully
urbanized economies the value of the housing stock in national wealth is quite important
and of the order of 20 to 25 percent of reproducible assets.  The potential transfer of
wealth to households is therefore massive. In the very early months of the transition there
was some confusion about the extent of an absolute housing shortage in these countries.
It is generally understood that these highly urbanized countries have more of a quality
than a quantity problems and, as Figure 1 vividly shows, pressures on the sector have
intensified.  As Figure 7 shows, the nearer geographically a country is to Western
Europe, the closer is its housing stock to the Western European ratio of about 440 units
per 1000 people.  Figure 7 also shows that Poland and Russia have a more significant
quantitative shortage. The quality problem however is serious everywhere. A very large
proportion of the socialist housing stock consists of very large, mass-produced industrial
housing estates, with small uniform units of about 55m2.  These units are energy
inefficient, costly to maintain, and frequently loathed by their occupants.  A significant
contributor to the long waiting lists everywhere was that the demand for housing was
artificially stimulated by absurdly low rents.  In most socialist countries, total housing
expenditures (i.e. rents plus utilities) were much less than 3 percent of total household
expenditures.  In market economies of comparable per capita GDP, this ratio is well
above 15 percent and often above 20 percent.  It is well known that in Russia total
monthly rent for a standard apartment was equal to the price of  a pack of cigarettes at the
start of the reforms.
7  See B. Renaud, Housing Reforms in Socialist Economies, World Bank, Discussion Paper 125,
June 1990, and Russia: Housing Reform and Privatization, World Bank Report No. 14929-RU, 1995.
8  Contractual and regulatory arrangements are at the core of housing reforms, not technology which
is easily transferable from Western to Eastern Europe, when it is not already available locally.  This crucial
policy perspective is missed by construction engineers or bureaucrat holdovers of construction ministries
with no professional knowledge of the real estate sector.
10FIGURE  7: Housing  Stock Level  in Selected  Countries,  1991
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3.2 Housing  is Caught  Between  Plan  and  Market
Today, housing in socialist economies is caught between plan and market.
Managing the transition toward markets requires the simultaneous pursuit of two very
distinct set of policies which should match the dualistic structure of the housing system.
One set of policies is needed to privatize the large inefficient stock of public housing, and
the other to encourage the rapid growth of the very small new private sector.
So far, the privatization of the public stock has been slowed by several factors.
First , privatization has been complicated by land property restitution policies and
inadequate or unclear administrative processes. There was a contradiction between the
profound desire for a return to a legally based civil society and the use of rough-and-
ready procedures to return property to former owners. Second, technical problems are
also serious.  Socialist housing systems have uniformly poor land registration and
cadastre.  The concept of real estate property combining land and buildings has to be
recreated --  or, in Russia, understood for the first time.  Much of housing privatization,
especially as it is practiced in many republics of the former Soviet Union  is merely the
privatization of apartments units to their occupants without clear rules about the
ownership and maintenance of the public spaces, and no delineation nor registration of
land boundaries.  Hence, the ubiquitous preoccupation with condominium laws and their
practical implementation. A third impediment to rapid privatization is the inability of the
various public owners of housing to achieve full cost recovery of housing maintenance
costs --  without speaking of capital costs which are typically ignored and treated as sunk
costs.  Under such conditions, why would occupants want to buy their units when it is so
much cheaper to rent than to own?  The implicit rent windfall is used for the purchase of
I  Inewly available capital goods such as home appliances and cars.  Fourth, there is a
circular causation problem: the absence of loans lowers the prospect for trading units
which in turns weakens mortgage loan demand.  The frequent mismatch between unit size
and household needs -- young couples have too little space, retirees have excess space--
then becomes another impediment to privatization to the occupants of the unit.
Contrasting with the old state system,  there is a small but rapidly growing private
housing supply which is the forerunner of the future market system.  However, this sector
serves mostly the high income groups who have been the first to achieve full and
substantial market wages.  They reject mass housing and demand new types of housing
units.
So far, governments are experiencing significant difficulties in articulating and
implementing the needed two-pronged housing policy.  Winding down the state sector
typically requires them to restructure their municipal housing and to truly privatize their
socialist cooperative housing stock which had been run by state-controlled organizations
in the past.  Supporting the rapid expansion of a diversified supply of private housing
requires reforms in four areas where the new transition administrations lack experience:
the implementation of market-oriented urban planning; the development of real estate
codes and the training of the new real estate professions; the reform of what remains
almost everywhere arbitrary and capricious taxation; and, finally the development of
financial services which is our main concern, but for which existing construction
ministries have neither the appropriate powers nor skills.
IV. FINANCIAL  SECTOR  REFORMS
The transformation of the old state financing mechanisms into a modern,
competitive financial system is a critical task that occupies reformers since the beginning
of the transition.  The overall financial sector strategy followed by governments --
whether this strategy has been adopted by design or by default -- inevitably shapes the
provision of specialized financial services such as housing finance.
The legacy of central planning and socialist administration is a
burdensome one.  In market economies, financial systems play a critical role in the
decentralized process of deposit mobilization, information processing and  resources
allocation across the full spectrum of activities in the economy.  In contrast, the
fundamental goal of a centrally planned economy was to transfer this critical resource
mobilization and allocation functions  to the state. As a result, banks were no really
banks.  Resource allocation decisions were made by the central planning authorities and
therefore a very small number of these banks were needed.  At the peak of central
planning, socialist economies ended up with a "monobank system".  This banking
system was structured as an integral part of the central allocation system managed with a
'credit plan" for investments and a much smaller "cash plan" for regular operations, and
wages.  There was  essentially one "state bank" such as Gosbank in the Soviet Union.  A
12monopoly savings bank was also present to collect household deposits to finance the plan
but it did not lend to anyone else.  Because this monobank system did not have any
autonomous resource allocation function it was merely an accounting and auditing arm of
the government for which it acted as a treasury.  Similarly, in terms of its functions,
organization and staffing, the ministry of finance of the day would be better described as
the "accounting and auditing" ministry.
There were constant problems with the slow and frequently inappropriate
decisions made by this centralized bureaucracy.  As secular decline set in, country after
country experimented with various types of administrative reforms affecting state
enterprises and banks.  However, these reforms did not challenge the central concept of
state control;  they just aimed to make it work better.  In banking, the monobank was
thus segmented into a few sector-oriented banks such as a bank for heavy industry, a bank
for international trade, a construction and industry bank, and a bank for social and
municipal investments.  This shift away from total centralization to the financing of
investment by sectoral banks did not really change the system for three fundamental
reasons. One reason is that the new banks still did not make independent decisions and
continued to wait for state instructions. Another is that these banks did not face any
financial risk as problem loans were refinanced by the state.  Finally, neither the behavior
of enterprise borrowers nor that of the banks did improve because they continued to
operate under a  "soft budget constraint".  That is to say, if a state-controlled institution
ran into financial difficulty because of wrong decisions it knew that it could rely on the
state to bail it out.
The dynamics of banking and financial sector reforms in a given country
can be evaluated with reference to two basic models.  One model is  the gradual
conversion of the existing state bank system.  The other is the radical transformation of
financial policies and financial institutions with the aim of creating rapidly an entirely
new banking system where the surviving pieces of the old systems would become very
different institutions.  A very important distinguishing factor shaping the dynamics of
these financial reforms is that they have been taking place under two very different
macroeconomic environments: in some cases moderate inflation, in others very high
inflation.  As was already mentioned,  financial reform strategies were adopted sometime
by design such as in Estonia or the Czech republic and sometime by default such as in
Russia where very high inflation and erratic decisions during the perestroika period often
forced the hand of reformers.  These two criteria leads us to a simple matrix reflecting
the actual diversity of country experiences across and within the four groups (Figure 8). 9
The distinction between gradual and radical reform was first made by Ronald 1.  MCKINNON in
particular in his monograph Gradual Versus Rapid Liberalization in Socialist Economies: Financial
Policies in China and Russia Compared, San Francisco, International center for Economic Growth,  1994.
However, McKinnon emphasizes the macroeconomic management perspective.  The characterization of
banking and capital reforms presented here extends work done by  Gerhard POIL  and  Constantijn
CLAESSENS of the World Bank in "Privatization and Banking Reform in Russia," March 1994.
13FIGURE  8: GRADUAL  VS.  RADICAL  FINANCIAL  REFORMS,  A MATRIX
GRADUAL  i RADICAL
REFORM  REFORM
Low Inflation  i  Hungary (roup  1) Estonia  (group  1)
'Poland  (group  1)  'Czech  Republic
Slovakia  (group  1)  (gup 1)
HighTn7hatition  BuTgaria(group  2), Russia  (group  3
Romania  (group  2)
Ukraine (group  4)
Belarus (group  4)  _
Under gradual reform, the basic approach is the modification of the
existing institutional structure and the conversion of financial administrations into
genuine banks.  The process starts with the creation of a two-tier system with on one level
a genuine central bank, and operating below it commercial banks.  Reform activities
include the introduction of new charts of accounts and new accounting standards based
on international practice for both banks and their client enterprises.  The necessity to open
the economy and the desire to converge quickly with the norms of the European Union
have facilitated the widespread acceptance of these difficult internal accounting changes.
The development of new prudential regulations for banks and the organization and
training of supervisory staff to manage a more competitive environment is also needed.
Because the banks carved out of the old system have inherited a substantial amount of
non-performing loans from the socialist era, the transition process usually requires a large
amount of work on balance-sheet restructuring and recapitalization.
The success of this gradual strategy depends to a significant extent on
measures taken outside the banking system, in particular enterprise reform and
privatization.  It became rapidly obvious to many that success in privatization and in
banking reform go hand in hand.  Privatization creates the proper incentives and
introduces the essential ingredient of a hard budget constraint into the management
process.  Without privatization of both enterprises and banks there will be little change in
behavior.  If the privatization process is held up by political forces, the danger of total
failure of banking reforms cannot be overlooked as many banks will be making new
rounds of post- 1989 bad loans to weak clients.  A fresh portfolio of new problem loans
14often concentrated in a small number of powerful state enterprises may require repeated
rounds of interventions, as has been the case in Hungary for instance.10
A smaller number of countries have chosen the path of more radical
reform. The new financial authorities recognized that the old banks were not really
banks.  These reformers were also deeply concerned by the difficulty of changing the old
bureaucratic culture of existing financial organizations. Radical reformers were therefore
willing to lower barriers to entry into the sector and to issue banking licenses to new
commercial banks relatively easily.  Because it was difficult to develop immediately a
strong bank supervisory function, the authorities placed less emphasis on regulation and
supervision.  Instead, they placed more reliance on market mechanisms, including bank
failure, to induce banks to manage their risks properly.  The decision of a government
and its central bank not bail out a failed commercial bank is a critical departure from the
past.  It sends an important message to banks and enterprises with very beneficial long-
term effects, as happened in countries like Estonia.
V.  HOUSING  FINANCE
5.1  The  Lack of Coherent  Housing  Finance  Strategies
A striking aspect of the early banking transition in most countries is the
recurrence of three strategic gaps in domestic financial reform policies, and also in
international advisory work.  Typically, retail banking, small and medium enterprise
(SME) finance, and housing finance have taken back seats in the reform process.  The
absence of a well articulated framework for housing finance reform as part of overall
banking reform is a cause for concern. So far, only  piecemeal actions have been taken
and they may be inconsistent with the desirable features of financial markets in the late
1990s and beyond. One of the reasons for this policy gap lies in the sequencing of
financial reform.  Initially, the attention of the new financial authorities had to
concentrate on the core systemic components of the transition.  They had to create an
autonomous central bank and implement new macroeconomic, monetary  and financial
policies as the earlier discussion of macroeconomic liberalization made clear.  The
authorities were concerned with building the core financial infrastructure of the new
system: laws, regulations, bank supervision, accounting systems, and payment systems.
They also had to focus in priority on the thorny problems of bank restructuring, and what
to do with bad loan portfolios and how to finance these bank restructuring activities.
By default, the leadership of the housing finance reforms usually fell into the lap
of construction or even social affairs ministries that were even less well equipped that
10  For views on these banking issues from the perspective of various multilateral institutions  see
Steven Fried (editor), Transition: Private Sector Development and the Role of Financial  Institutions,
London: EBRD Working Paper No. 13, July 1994.
15their Western European counterparts to address this financial task.  Under central
planning, construction ministries were line agencies with limited responsibility for policy
work. Their main focus was on the implementation of projects funded by the plan.
Inevitably, these agencies were more aware of the needs of the construction industry as
their primary client than of other stakeholders in the housing system, be they final
consumers or banks.  They had little reason to develop expertise in finance and banking.
It is therefore not surprising to see them adopting existing housing finance instruments
such as loan-linked saving instruments, mortgage instruments, and any public tool that
had succeeded in markets economies.  Yet their staff were ill-equipped to carry out the
"reverse financial engineering" needed to understand why these instruments worked
elsewhere.
FIGURE  9: A Framework  for Sustainable  Financial  Development
a  l  Build  Upgre  Develop  Develop Capita
Policies  Infastructure  a  Skills  Institutions  markets and
Macto  Laws  Seminars  Bank  eo'vemment
stabIlity  for  restructuring  Securtes
policymakers  markets
I  | ~Regulations|
Interest  and  I
exchange  Training  FINANCE  PIlvte
rate  polcy  Banking  Institute  scure
superson  Ra  markIs
|Government  |ntttoa  liac  l  ManeySl} 
credit  Acontndeeomtad  ,x
policy  asystems  p  r  oam
l  Pen~~~~~aln*  "and
Sequencing  Payment
|  ~~~~systemsflac|
The  Central  Question  for a  Housing  Finance  Strategy
The central question in the design of a housing finance strategy is: "Why is it that
banks do not lendfor housing?"  This question requires sector policy makers to change
their focus and to look beyond short-term expedients to revive the construction sector and
to think about the overall design of a sound housing finance.  After all, the volume of
loans made every year will depend on the financial processes to mobilize funds and on
the management of the variety of financial and operational risks that are inherent to long-
term housing finance and should not be borne by the state.  Admittedly, this question
requires a drastic change of perspective for officials who could not and did not even
distinguish between housing finance and housing subsidies under central planning.  One
of the lessons of the developing countries is that there is nothing romantic about the
informal sector that is encountered in too many places.  We have learned that the informal
sector results mostly from inappropriate regulatory frameworks that prevent banks from
16voluntarily financing the sector because it is not financially sustainable.  There is no
conspiracy there: why would private developers and bankers deliberately price
themselves away from the bulk of the potential market? The real issue then is to identify
and remedy the risks that make it impossible for a lender to lend in a sustainable and
profitable way for a broad clientele. During the early transition, the risks of mortgage
lending were substantial.
Credit risk is the first issue. The tried and tested ways of managing this risk that
are in use in market economies have had to be rebuilt or adapted in transition economies.
Initially, property laws had to be rewritten to recreate the concept of real estate.  Privately
managing the bundle of land and building rights that constitute real estate property in
market economy is still a new way of operating.  The requirements of residential and
business real estate development often remain poorly understood or accepted by central
and city  administrations.  In Russia, in particular, it is proving politically very difficult to
develop the concept of private land ownership and to accept the trading of land and the
emergence of land markets. "  Another problem is that the privatization of the housing
stock originally had gaping holes in many countries. Apartments units were privatized,
but in the absence of condominium laws and the creation of condominium associations
the financing and maintenance by residents of the public space and the networks within
the buildings by could not be done adequately.  Another frequent problem was, and still
is, that land property boundaries were not drawn up and recorded at the time of
construction under the state system.  They now need to be defined and accepted by parties
often suspicious of each other.
Collateralized lending is a problem everywhere for long term lending because of
the legacy of poor land titling from both legal and purely technical point of views.  Even
in countries with a tradition of high quality registration, like east Germany,  "land books"
were no longer properly maintained during the socialist era. The legacy of the old state
urban planning is still being felt everywhere. Stable and sound land use systems are
emerging in a painfully slow way.  Old urban plans and old urban cadres constrain the
entire property sector and therefore all forms of physical investment. From a direct
mortgage lending point of view, inadequate credit and collateral laws still create large
credit risks for lenders. New foreclosure laws have had to be written and generally
remain untested to this day.  Alternative forms of collateral lending that differ from the
usual Western foreclosure practices may therefore be useful.
In terms of bank management, long-term housing lending creates significant
liquidity risks, interest rate risks, and market risks.  The instruments and financial
markets to manage these risks are now beginning to function properly in the group of
advanced reformers.  In particular, money markets are now beginning to function  for
"1  See, Alain BERTAUD and Bertrand RENAUD, Cities Without Land Markets, Lessons of the
Failed Socialist Experiment,  World Bank Staff Discussion Paper 227,  1994.
17liquidity management in support of commercial loans.  However secondary market
facilities specifically supporting long-term housing lending can play a central role but do
not exists in any of these countries.  Volatile inflation and political pressures to control
interest rates are another problem for mortgage lenders. The development of contractual
savings institutions such as pension funds and life insurance offers  the promise of
improvement for the management of interest risk and market risks by developing
institutions with the capacity to bear such risks.  The lack of credit skills and inadequate
capital are other constraints to mortgage lending that are slowly being met.
Given the institutional and political context of the transition, the lack of coherent
housing finance strategies can be lamented, but it is perfectly understandable. Fragmented
ownership rights, insular and competing bureaucracies, scarce financial skills and
information systems that are not geared to market monitoring readily explain the pattern
of piecemeal policy decisions that is usually observed.  Major efforts are now being made
to overcome this socialist legacy on the real estate side.  In parallel, the development of
coherent housing finance policies as a vehicle to bring together line construction
ministries, the ministry of finance and the central bank could speed up change
considerably.  A large amount of public education on appropriate housing and housing
finance policies, beginning with parliaments, would also make a great difference.
What  Housing  Finance  System  in Transition  Economies?
A housing finance strategy should be well integrated with the development of the
rest of the financial sector.  The initial question raised by reformers is what kind of
Western model should be followed.  A typical reflex of Western consultants is to
promote their own national model of housing finance because it works, and because that
is the system that they understand the best.  However, these existing systems are fifty to
seventy years old and they are now evolving significantly with the revolution in
information technology and in financial engineering in a context of extremely rapid
globalization of financial markets.  In particular, should these latecomer countries aim at
the development of special housing finance circuits in favor of which construction
ministries are strongly predisposed by the legacy of the past and the poor state of the
sector for which they are directly responsible?
There are good reasons to argue that the transition economies of Eastern Europe
should aim at housing finance systems that deliver specialized services to the sector
within fully integrated and competitive financial markets.  Latecomers should and can
avoid special  housing  finance  circuits that consist of narrowly specialized institutions
whose housing finance activities benefit from special fiscal and regulatory privileges at
the cost of important regulatory restrictions on their lines of business and their products.
There are presently strong forces at work in favor of open housing finance systems.
Trade barriers continue to decline and all economies are opening up to the world
economy.  This trend is supported by the rapid growth of global financial markets.  In
Eastern Europe, this means convergence with the rapidly integrating financial systems of
the European Union.
18Around the world the decline of special housing finance circuits coexists with the
overall expansion of the total housing finance system.  2  The forces at work behind
financial liberalization and innovations are associated with the new approach to
macroeconomic management of most countries.'3 Financial liberalization has led to
many decisions including: the lifting of credit ceilings;  changes in bank supervision in
direct support of  active risk management by financial institutions;  the freeing of interest
rates that permits the trading of fixed income securities, among which mortgage-backed
securities of various kinds play a dominant role;  asset powers deregulation in parallel
with better financial markets for risk management; competitive deposits and savings
market in which mutual funds play an influential role.  Last but not least, the rapid
emergence of private long-term investors such as pension funds and life insurance
companies is expected to play a large and very positive role for the growth of efficient
and effective housing finance systems.
If one had to venture a guess about the future, one would expect that the transition
economies that have achieved low inflation and have adopted radical banking reforms
will be the first to develop a modem housing finance system.  Within this system we
should find: full service deposit institutions that have chosen housing as one line of
business, mortgage banking firms, secondary market facilities and an integrated, efficient
and resilient overall financial system.  Complementary to these private financial
institutions, there will be public arrangements for the delivery of targeted public subsidies
to special groups that should be transparent, distinct from, but often complementary to
commercial housing finance.  Knowing where they want to go will help these transition
countries find the shortest path and avoid blind alleys.
12  See,  Douglas  B. DIAMOND,  Jr. and Michael  J. LEA "The Decline  of Special  Circuits  in
Developed  Country  Housing  Finance",  Housing  Policy  Debate,  Vol.3, Issue  3, 1992,  Washington  DC.
13  In his opening address  to the XXIrst World  Congress  of Housing  Finance  Institutions,  Governor
Eddie  GEORGE  of the Bank of England  clearly  outlined  the implications  of the goal  of a stable  medium-
and long-term  macro-economic  environment  for the housing  sector  and housing  finance.
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